The Tennessee Court of Appeals issued a new opinion in Plunkett v. Bradley-Polk, OB/GYN Serv’s, P.C. - you can download a copy of the opinion by clicking [HERE].

In Plunkett, the plaintiff relied upon a skilled physician to deliver expert testimony that the defendants failed to comply with the applicable standard of care. Although the defendants moved to exclude the expert before trial, when a new judge took over the case at trial, the defendants moved again to exclude the expert. The court agreed with the defendant, excluded the expert and forced the plaintiff to appeal.

In what is a thorough review by the Tennessee Court of Appeals on how to qualify an expert in a medical malpractice case, the court reversed and vacated the judgment of the trial court. The expert was qualified:

As we discussed in Farley v. Oak Ridge Medical Imaging, No. E2008-01731-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 2474742 (Tenn. Ct. App., E.S., filed August 13, 2009), parties and their experts have satisfied this “locality rule” in a variety of ways with a variety of information. In Taylor v. Jackson-Madison Cty. Gen. Hosp., 231 S.W.3d 361 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006), an emergency physician with a practice in Atlanta was allowed to testify that Jackson, Tennessee, was similar to Gainesville, Georgia, a community about 40 miles north of Atlanta where the expert also practiced emergency medicine. The comparison was made based on information gleaned from phone books, chambers of commerce for the respective communities and information available from the hospitals in the communities. See Farley, 2009 WL 2474742 at *10. In Bravo v. Sumner Regional Health Systems, 148 S.W.3d 357 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003), an Atlanta physician was qualified to testify that Rome, Georgia, was similar to Gallatin, Tennessee, based on referrals he received from physicians in Rome, Georgia, his review of records from that community, and information gained from seminars. See Farley, 2009 WL 2474742 at *10. In Stovall v. Clark, 113 S.W.3d 715 (Tenn. 2003), a Missouri doctor was allowed to testify that Marshall, Missouri, was similar to Franklin, Tennessee, based on his review of demographic information and his previous involvement as an expert in Tennessee having reviewed “over 20 charts.” Farley, 2009 WL 2474742 at *10 (quoting Stovall, 113 S.W.3d at 719). One of the cases we discussed in Farley was Ledford, 742 S.W.2d at 645, which involved the community of Cleveland, Tennessee. The plaintiff’s expert practiced in Atlanta but testified of “‘familiarity with the standard of care in small towns all over Georgia’ from accepting referrals and interacting with the referring doctors.” Farley, 2009 WL 2474742 at *11 (quoting Ledford, 742 S.W.2d at 648). The Atlanta neurologist was thus allowed to testify that the standard of care for psychiatrists in Cleveland would be the same as the standard of care for psychiatrists in similar “small towns” neighboring Atlanta. Id. In Farley we concluded our survey of the cases by stating:

If the expert is otherwise qualified, it is enough if he or she is actually practicing in some community in a contiguous state, and “connects the dots” between the standard in that community and the community where the alleged malpractice occurred. The fact that the dots must traverse from the community of practice through the similar community to the community of the alleged malpractice, such as from Kansas City, Missouri, through St. Joseph, Missouri, to Clarksville, Tennessee, will not defeat the connection. Referrals from and interaction with medical providers in neighboring communities, combined with “a comparison of information such as the size, location, and presence [or absence] of teaching hospitals in the two communities” should suffice.

Farley, 2009 WL 2474742 at *11.

This is a welcome ruling from the Court of Appeals.